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“RACE IS NOT A DETERMINATIVE
FACTOR”1: MIXED RACE CHILDREN AND
CUSTODY CASES IN CANADA*
Susan B. Boyd and Krisha Dhaliwal**
Statistics suggest that an increase will occur in the number of custody
disputes involving mixed race children in Canada. This article
considers the extent to which the fact that a child is mixed race factors
into child custody determinations, and how courts consider it. It also
discusses whether considering a child’s mixed race heritage is
helpful in the child-custody context. The article first explains the use
of “race” and “culture” in the Canadian context, then reviews the
literature on mixed race children and the law, before examining
legislation on the “best interests of the child.” The focus of the paper
is an analysis of reported Canadian custody cases in which a child’s
mixed race heritage was mentioned in the written judgment, both
before and after the leading case, Van de Perre v. Edwards. The caselaw analysis considers questions such as judicial racism, “racematching,” and how race and culture are weighed against other
factors relevant to a child’s best interests. The conclusion offers
suggestions for how courts should deal with custody disputes over
mixed race children, based on trends identified in the case law. While
racialized parents are not inevitably best suited for primary custody
of mixed race children, it is key for any parent seeking custody to

1

Van de Perre v Edwards, 2001 SCC 60 at para 39, [2001] 2 SCR 1014 [Van
de Perre].
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demonstrate their ability to foster the healthy development of a
child’s multifaceted identity. More directive legislative language
might be useful in order to ensure that at least some judicial attention
is paid to race and culture. Finally, taking judicial notice of the
relevance of race would also be helpful in acknowledging the
persistent existence of racism in Canadian society, as would a more
diversified Canadian judiciary.
INTRODUCTION
The number of mixed race couples is on the rise in Canada; they
constitute 4.6 per cent of all married and common-law couples, up from
2.6 per cent in 1991 and 3.1 per cent in 2001.2 Although not all couples
conceive children and not all children are raised in couples, these
statistics suggest that the legal system is likely to see more custody

2

See e.g. Statistics Canada, “A Portrait of Couples in Mixed Unions”, by Anne
Milan, Hélène Maheux & Tina Chui, in Canadian Social Trends, Catalogue
No 11-008-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 20 April 2010) 70-80; Statistics
Canada, “Mixed Unions in Canada”, in National Household Survey,
Catalogue 99-010-X2011003 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2011) at 4. Roughly
half of these couples are made up of one Canadian-born person and one
foreign-born person, with Japanese, Latin American, and Black people being
the most likely to be in mixed raced unions, and with South Asian and Chinese
people (the two largest minorities in Canada) being the least likely to marry
outside their groups. See Statistics Canada, “Mixed Unions in Canada”, ibid
at 4-5. The majority of mixed race unions are between one visible minority
person, and one non-visible minority person. See ibid at 4. Also, the vast
majority of mixed race couples live in major metropolitan areas. See ibid at 7.
Finally, Milan, Maheux & Chui, supra note 2, have pointed out that as a
whole, racialized men and women are equally likely to be in mixed race
unions. However, there are differences within certain subgroups. For instance,
men from Arab, West Asian, Black, and South Asian backgrounds are more
likely than women from these backgrounds to partner with people outside of
their group. Similarly, women from Filipino, Korean, Southeast Asian,
Japanese, Chinese, and Latin American backgrounds are more likely than men
from these backgrounds to be in mixed race unions. See ibid at 17.
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disputes involving mixed race children in the future. Some such
disputes have, of course, already come before the courts. In such cases,
it is sometimes argued that a visible minority parent may be better able
to deal with the child’s experiences of racism or that race should at
least be a factor that must be considered in determining the best
interests of a child.
This article examines the extent to which the fact that a child
is mixed race makes a difference, or should make a difference, in the
determination of legal disputes about parental rights and
responsibilities or custody,3 and, if so, how. In order to better
understand the issues that arise in such cases, we reviewed literature
on mixed race children and law, as well as legislation on the best
interests of the child. The heart of our study, however, is an analysis of
reported Canadian custody cases where a child’s mixed race heritage
was mentioned in the written judgment. In our search for both cases
and for literature, we included mixed race children with Aboriginal
heritage. Some of the cases discussed in this paper do not deal with
race directly, but rather with related, but distinct, issues of culture,
which include religion and language.
Custody decisions are notoriously difficult and judges struggle
to balance the different factors that may be in play in any given case.
One question we considered is whether a focus on factors such as
stability or a history of care may diminish attention that ought to be
devoted to the significance of race, culture, or racism in the child’s life.
Although our conclusion suggests that greater account of race in a

3

Many jurisdictions have now abandoned the terminology of “custody” and
“access” in favour of concepts such as parenting time and parental
responsibilities (e.g. Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25). We use “custody” as
a generic term in this article, and we use it to refer to disputes between
individuals (usually parents), not between individuals and the state (child
protection). The Canadian Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 still uses the language
of custody and access, as do several provincial statutes.
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child’s life should be taken in many cases, it should be noted that this
field of law also has a history of failing to take account of other
important factors, such as gendered inequalities like women’s
generally greater responsibility for care of children.4 Another problem
is that any judicial emphasis on financial or household stability in a
child’s life can disadvantage a parent who faces economic challenges
but who may nevertheless be a good parent. As Charmaine Williams
has argued, any analysis of cases involving mixed race children must
use an analytical framework that understands the ways in which race,
class, and gender interact and generate complex patterns of advantage
and jeopardy.5 Although the best interests of the child are manifestly
the paramount consideration in any custody case, determination of the
outcome is not insulated from the filters of race, class, and gender, even
if these factors are not explicitly discussed in the judgment.6
This article proceeds as follows. We first review our approach
to race, culture, and ethnicity and offer a brief analysis of how race and
racism are treated in Canada. We then briefly review relevant
legislation in Canada and internationally. Next, our case law review
begins with a discussion of the leading case in Canada, Van de Perre
v. Edwards.7 Our detailed case-law study attempts to isolate various
issues that we anticipated might arise in cases involving mixed race
children. In particular, we are concerned with how race and culture are
weighed against other factors relevant to a child’s best interests. We

4

Susan B Boyd, Child Custody, Law, and Women’s Work (Don Mills: Oxford
University Press, 2003) [Boyd, Child Custody]; Carol Smart & Selma
Sevenhuijsen, eds, Child Custody and the Politics of Gender (London:
Routledge, 1989).

5

Charmaine C Williams, “Race (and Gender and Class) and Child Custody:
Theorizing Intersections in Two Canadian Court Cases” (2004) 16:2 NWSA
Journal 46.

6

Andrea Doucet, “Parental Responsibilities: Dilemmas of Measurement and
Gender Equality” (2015) 77:1 J of Marriage and Family 224.

7

Van de Perre, supra note 1.
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also ask whether judicial racism can be detected on the face of the
judgments and whether an essentialist “race-matching” approach is
used. In our conclusion, we suggest that judicial notice should be taken
of race and racism, and that race and racism should always be at least
considered when custody of a mixed race child is at issue. That said,
other factors remain key to determining a child’s best interests and we
do not suggest that a racialized parent is inevitably better suited to
assume primary care or custody of a child.
APPROACHES TO RACE, CULTURE, AND ETHNICITY
Even though judges often use race and culture interchangeably,8 for the
purposes of this article, we adopt Emily Carasco’s definition of race,
which she suggests is conceptually distinct from culture and ethnicity.9
Whereas culture and ethnicity are based on factors such as kinship and
a common sense of belonging, and are more complex, ongoing, and
learned, race is based on more immutable external biological factors
such as skin colour, the shape of facial features, and other physical
characteristics.10 Despite the fact that racial categorization is widely
acknowledged to be arbitrary and unscientific, it has persisted into the
present day, along with the attendant social phenomenon of racism. 11
As Minelle Mahtani reminds us, there is an “arbitrary connection
between anatomical features and political meaning, where certain
physical differences (like skin colour and hair type) have been used to

8

See Tammy Wing-Yun Law, “The Race Issue in Custody Law: Is Van de
Perre Right?” (2003) 21 Can Fam LQ 153 at 154.

9

Emily F Carasco, “Race and Child Custody in Canada: Its Relevance and
Role” (1999) 16 Can J Fam L 11 at 11, 24.

10

For more commentary on this understanding of race in the context of Canadian
child custody law, see Law, supra note 8 at 153-54; Annie Bunting,
“Complicating Culture in Child Placement Decisions” (2004) 16 CJWL 137
at 141 49.

11

Carasco, supra note 9 at 24 25.
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indicate crucial power differentials between individuals.”12 That is,
race is a social construction rather than a biological fact, but that insight
does not mean that race, or perhaps more aptly racism, has no
consequences in the real world.13 Specifically in our context, a child’s
racial identity or perceived race can play a significant role in her
development.14
Canadian scholars have revealed that racial hierarchies have
been created and reinforced through various policies and laws.15 In
western liberal democracies such as Canada, “whiteness” has long
operated as a guiding feature of racial categorization. Who counts as

12

Minelle Mahtani, Mixed Race Amnesia: Resisting the Romanticization of
Multiraciality (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014) at 23.

13

Ibid at 24.

14

See Law’s review of social science research, supra note 8 at 160ff. See also
Roland G Fryer Jr et al, “The Plight of Mixed Race Adolescents” (2012) 94:3
Rev of Economics and Statistics 621; Christopher S Ruebeck, Susan L Averett
& Howard Bodenhorn, “Acting White or Acting Black: Mixed-Race
Adolescents’ Identity and Behavior” (2009) 9:1 BE J Economic Analysis &
Policy 1; David R Harris & Jeremiah Joseph Sim, “Who Is Multiracial?
Assessing the Complexity of Lived Race” (2002) 67 American Sociological
Rev 614; Grace Kao, “Racial Identity and Academic Performance: An
Examination of Biracial Asian and African American Youth” (1999) 2:3 J
Asian American Studies 223.

15

See e.g. Constance C Backhouse, Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism
in Canada, 1900-1950 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). As Law,
supra note 8, and others point out, Canada does in fact have its own racist
history. For instance, our immigration policy has a notably dark past,
including the Chinese “head tax” imposed by the Chinese Immigration Act,
RSC 1885, c 71, as well as Canada’s general historical preference for north
European immigrants. See generally Leo Driedger & Shiva S Halli, eds, Race
and Racism: Canada’s Challenge (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2000) at 7.
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white16 has changed over time,17 but whiteness as a concept has always
“denote[d] the racial chasm that separated [white] groups from
‘Aboriginal peoples,’ the ‘Chinese,’ and ‘Blacks.’”18 Whiteness,
though its definition is mutable, is taken for granted as an unspoken
norm. That is, whiteness need not be static in order for other racial

16

To make a brief note on nomenclature, this paper will capitalize all terms used
to denote racial categories, apart from the term “white.” This follows the
practice of many critical race scholars, such as Erica Chung-Yue Tao, who
explained the practice as follows, in “Re-defining Race Relations—Beyond
the Threat of ‘Loving Blackness’” (1993) 6:2 CJWL 455 at 457: “Language
and conventions in writing are integral to internalized colonization. The
capitalization of Black and Blackness becomes a disruption in reading,
because it breaches the standard way of communicating in textual format. In
this way, capitalization of Black represents a perverse usage of the colonizer’s
language, and is, therefore, a visual and linguistic subversion of white
supremacy. At the same time, capitalizing Black also affirms pride and power
in group identity. For example, we say we are Canadians, not canadians.
Finally, the word ‘white’ will not be capitalized on the grounds that white and
whiteness are the reference points by which all other colours or racially
defined groups are measured, named, described, and understood. To capitalize
white would be, in effect, to say the obvious and affirm the norm.” See also
Backhouse, supra note 15 at 8. We will also use the term “racialized” (as
opposed to terms such as “person of colour”) to acknowledge that racial
categorization results from a social process and is not biologically inherent.
Finally, we will use the terms “minority” and “visible minority,” as these are
terms that have historically been used in Canadian legislation.

17

See Backhouse, supra note 15 at 9: “Some will argue that the individuals I
have designated as ‘white’ probably did not understand themselves as ‘white,’
and preferred to think of themselves as having a particular country of origin. .
. . It is true that the racial identity of the dominant white group was splintered
in many directions (not unlike the racial identity of other groups), and that
multiple subgroups formed distinct rankings (which would themselves shift
over time).”

18

Ibid.
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identities to be measured in contrast to that norm and “othered” as a
result.19
The genesis of Canada as a “white” country is tied to our
colonial history. Whites began to outnumber the Aboriginal population
in the late 1700s and early 1800s, with non-Aboriginals outnumbering
Aboriginals by an estimation of ten to one by 1812.20 Nevertheless,
many Canadians view Canada as being relatively untroubled by racism
and as having a benign history of race relations, especially when
compared to the United States.21 Alongside some of the more overtly
racist practices, for instance against Chinese immigrants,22 a “melting
pot” approach was common in the early twentieth century, suggesting
that the Canadian nation was homogenous and that immigrant and
ethnic populations should blend into dominant Canadian culture.23 Yet

19

See generally Sherene H Razack, Looking White People in the Eye: Gender,
Race, and Culture in Courtrooms and Classrooms (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1998) [Razack, Looking]; Sherene Razack, Space, Race, and
the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society (Toronto: Between the Lines,
2002); Leo Driedger & Angus Reid, “Public Opinion on Visible Minorities”
in Driedger & Halli, supra note 15, 152 at 158 59; Peggy McIntosh, “White
Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See
Correspondences Through Work in Women’s Studies” Working Paper No
189, Wellesley College, Centre for Research on Women; Richard Dyer, “The
Matter of Whiteness” in Paula S Rothenberg, ed, White Privilege: Essential
Readings on the Other Side of Racism (New York: Worth, 2002) 89.

20

Canada, Royal Commission, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples: Looking Forward, Looking Back, vol 1 (Ottawa: Supply and
Services Canada, 1996) at 1.6.

21

See e.g. Razack, Looking, supra note 19 at 16 17; Williams, supra note 5 at
46.

22

See comments in supra note 15.

23

For a discussion on theories of racial integration, including “melting pot”
theories of assimilation and homogenization, see Leo Driedger & Shiva S
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despite the practice since the 1970s24 of affirming the multicultural
nature of Canada,25 the extent to which racial and cultural difference
should be recognized or encouraged remains controversial.26 So too do

Halli, “Racial Integration: Theoretical Options” [Driedger & Halli, “Racial
Integration”] in Driedger & Halli, supra note 15, 55 at 55 76.
24

See Canadian Multiculturalism Act, RSC 1985, c 24; Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B
to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 27 (“This Charter shall be
interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of
the multicultural heritage of Canadians”).

25

For a critical summary and assessment of Canada’s use of multiculturalism,
see Mahtani, supra note 12 at 98 111. For recent affirmations of
multiculturalism from the Canadian government, see e.g. Canada, Citizenship
and Immigration Canada, “Annual Report on the Operation of the Canadian
Multiculturalism Act 2012 2013” (Ottawa: CIC, 3 February 2014), online:
<www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/
publications/multi-report2013/3.asp>;
Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Canadian Multiculturalism:
An Inclusive Citizenship” (Ottawa: CIC, 19 October 2012), online:
<www.cic.
gc.ca/english/multiculturalism/citizenship.asp>;
Canada,
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Multiculturalism” Ottawa: CIC, 7 May
2014), online: <hwww.cic.gc.ca/ENGLISH/multiculturalism/index.asp?>.

26

See e.g. the controversy surrounding the proposed “Charter of Quebec
Values” (Bill 60, Charter affirming the values of State secularism and
religious neutrality and of equality between women and men, and providing a
framework for accommodation requests, 1st Sess, 40th Leg, Quebec, 2013).
Bill 60 died on the order paper when the Parti Quebecois lost the 2014 Quebec
provincial election to the Quebec Liberal Party. Though many self-proclaimed
secular and feminist Quebeckers supported the proposed Charter, it was also
heavily criticized for being ethnocentric and xenophobic, as it would have
prevented public sector employees from wearing “conspicuous” religious
symbols or articles of clothing (such as turbans, hijabs, nijabs, or kippahs),
which would largely have been worn by racial, cultural, and religious
minorities. For more discussion on the proposed Charter and its connection to
racial and cultural assimilation, see e.g. Supriya Dwivedi, “Quebec Can Be
Perfectly Secular without an Offensive Charter” The Globe and Mail (10
September 2013), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-
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the questions of whether racism exists and how to deal with it.27
Multicultural policy has been criticized for its inadequacy in
achieving antiracist objectives and, indeed, its failure to define “race”
or to address racism as a “social relationship of dominance and
subordination, created by and engendering structural inequality.”28
Sherene Razack suggests that the policy of multiculturalism in Canada
has aided a transition away from the discourse of race and racism to
one of culture and language. This “culturalization of racism” attributes
Black “inferiority,” for instance, to factors such as cultural deficiency,
social inadequacy, and technological underdevelopment rather than
structural forces such as racism.29 Vrinda Narain has similarly
suggested that the focus on cultural difference has diminished attention
to structural inequalities such as poverty, unemployment, and racism.30
When judges deal with disputes over children, the tendency to focus
on the individual at the expense of larger structural issues is

debate/quebec-can-be-perfectly-secular-without-an-offensivecharter/article14214333>; Emmett MacFarlane, “Quebec’s Secular Charter is
Clearly Unconstitutional, but Could Still Become Law” The Globe and Mail
(11 September 2013), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globedebate/quebecs-secular-charter-is-clearly-unconstitutional-it-could-stillbecome-law/article14241046>. For a critique of Canadian multiculturalism in
practice that predates the Quebec Charter controversy, see Neil Bissoondath,
Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada (Toronto: Penguin
Random House Canada, 2002).
27

See generally Rakhi Ruparelia, “Legal Feminism and the Post-Racism
Fantasy” (2014) 26:1 CJWL 81.

28

Audrey Kobayashi, “Multiculturalism: Representing a Canadian Institution”
in JS Duncan & D Ley, eds, Place/Culture/Representation (London:
Routledge, 1993) 205 at 221 22.

29

Razack, Looking, supra note 19 at 60.

30

See generally Vrinda Narain, “Taking ‘Culture’ out of Multiculturalism”
(2014) 26:1 CJWL 116.
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exacerbated due to the need to make a decision in relation to the
individuals at issue.31
Given these complex and controversial questions, and given
the tendency of Canadians to cherish the notion that Canada is a
particularly tolerant nation, it is not uncommon for us to maintain
silence around issues concerning race and racism or even to deny that
racism exists.32 It would not be surprising to find that some judges (who
are still predominantly white in Canada33) share this approach and that
some may adhere to the (optimistic) notion that Canada is relatively
free of racism or is “race blind.” They may be challenged by the
suggestion that they should take race and the possibility of racism
seriously in their judicial decision making and may genuinely feel they
do not know how to do so. They may fall prey to ethnocentrism and
unconscious cultural biases.34 We return to this issue when discussing
judicial education in the conclusion.

31

See Marlee Kline, “Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood: Child Welfare
Law and First Nation Women” (1993) 18 Queen’s LJ 306.

32

Razack, Looking, supra note 19 at 60 61

33

It is difficult to find statistics on judicial diversity: see Sonia Lawrence,
“Reflections: On Judicial Diversity and Judicial Independence” in Adam
Dodek & Lorne Sossin, eds, Judicial Independence in Context (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2010) 193. But see also Kirk Makin, “Of 100 new federally appointed
judges, 98 are white, Globe finds” The Globe and Mail (17 April 2012),
online:
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/of-100-newfederally-appointed-judges-98-are-white-globe-finds/article4101504>.
Although the percentage of women judges remains lower than it should be,
the paucity of racialized judges is particularly striking, and judicial
appointments are clearly failing to keep pace with the number of racialized
lawyers in the profession, as well as the number of racialized Canadians. See
Rosemary Cairns Way, “Deliberate Disregard: Judicial Appointments under
the Harper Government” (2014) 67 SCLR (2d Series) 43.

34

See Amber Chew, “Judicial Consideration of Culture in Child-Related
Proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)” (2007) 21:2 Austl J Fam
L 173 at Part V.
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The uncertainty about how to deal with racism in law is
illustrated by the controversy that emerged in R. v. R.D.S.,35 a case on
reasonable apprehension of bias that began with the criminal trial of a
black youth. Judge Corinne Sparks, the first African Nova Scotian to
be appointed to the judiciary and the first African Canadian female to
serve on the bench,36 rendered the trial decision. In her acquittal of the
youth, who was facing criminal charges for allegedly assaulting a
police officer, Judge Sparks suggested racism on the part of the white
police officer, and commented on how the police officer’s treatment of
the youth was “in keeping with the prevalent attitude of the
day.”37Although the lower Courts agreed that there could be a
reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of Judge Sparks, the
Supreme Court of Canada restored her decision to acquit the youth, and
noted that “[a] judge who happens to be black is no more likely to be
biased in dealing with black litigants, than a white judge is likely to be
biased in favour of white litigants.”38 The media coverage of this case,
as with the Van de Perre v. Edwards case discussed below, broke the
silence and signalled that uncomfortable conversations about the role
of race and racism had arisen.39

35

[1997] 3 SCR 484, 151 DLR (4th) 193 [RDS cited to SCR].

36

Sharon Melson Fletcher, “Corinne Sparks Biography” Brief Biographies,
online: <http://biography.jrank.org/pages/2828/Sparks-Corinne.html>.

37

RDS, supra note 35 at para 4.

38

Ibid at para 115. For more on this controversy, see Richard Devlin & Dianne
Pothier, “Redressing the Imbalances: Rethinking the Judicial Role after R. v.
R.D.S.” (1999-2000) 31 Ottawa L Rev 1; Allan C Hutchinson & Kathleen
Strachan, “Forum on R. v. R.D.S.: What’s the Difference? Interpretation,
Identity and R. v. R.D.S.” (1998) 21 Dal LJ 219; April Burey, “Forum on R.
v. R.D.S.: No Dichotomies: Reflections on Equality for African Canadians in
R. v. R.D.S.” (1998) 21 Dal LJ 199.

39

See e.g. Jim Bronskill, “High Court Sets Rules on Judicial Bias: Black Judge’s
Comments Inappropriate but Did Not Cross the Line” The Ottawa Citizen (27
September 1997) A3; Joey Thompson, “Teen’s Acquittal Prompts Legal
Ruling on Racism” The Province (10 October 1997) A16; David Vienneau,

“Race Is Not a Determinative Factor”

321

Informed by the notions that race, as it is constructed in
Western societies, remains a key marker and that it intersects with other
factors such as gender and class,40 we try to take a non-essentialist
approach to race in this article. We agree with Carasco that race is
deeply relevant to the development of children’s identity and to their
future in society, and we also note that Carasco would not make race a
singularly determinative factor in a best-interests test.41 An essentialist
approach to race would hold that racial categorization based on skin
colour and other aspects of physical appearance indicates other
characteristics, such as intelligence, inclinations, and talents.42 A nonessentialist approach, on the other hand, understands that racial
categorization based on physical appearance does not entail any other
characteristics, and understands race to have “meaning only as a
socially constructed category” that divides people artificially.43 In the
custody context, an essentialist approach might assume that certain
negative qualities are associated with particular races and dictate
against placement of a child with a parent from that race. Or, an
essentialist approach might assume, rather simplistically, that a racematching approach is most appropriate. That is, placing a racialized
child with the parent who has similar skin colour and other physical
attributes to the child might be best, since these matching physical
attributes could indicate other similar qualities, and thus greater
parental suitability. This approach also potentially perpetuates racist
stereotyping.44 As we shall see, some judges have adopted an overly

“Judge Cleared Over Race Remarks: Top Court Deals with Bias Charge”
Toronto Star (27 September 1997) A3. See also Williams, supra note 5.
40

Kline, supra note 31; Williams, supra note 5; Bunting, supra note 10.

41

Carasco, supra note 9.

42

Anna Stubblefield, “Racial Identity and Non-Essentialism about Race” (1995)
21:3 Social Theory & Practice 341 at 341.

43

Ibid.

44

Bunting, supra note 10 at 142; Christine Davies, QC, “Racial and Cultural
Issues in Custody Matters” (1993) 10 Can Fam LQ 1 at 30 31; Ya’ir Ronen,
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simplistic and potentially prejudicial race-matching approach.
Before reviewing the jurisprudence on custody and mixed race
children, however, we offer an analysis of how legislation on the best
interests of the child in Canada and selected other jurisdictions deals
with race and culture.
LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS
Our search for legislation in Canada and other countries with similar
legal systems that addresses race, ethnicity, or culture in the custody
context revealed that there is quite a disparity in approach. By no
means does all such legislation refer to these factors, and “race” and
Aboriginality per se are rarely mentioned.
All Canadian legislation on child custody other than that in
Quebec makes it clear that the best interests of the child are the sole or
paramount consideration rather than, say, parental interests.45 For
instance, British Columbia’s new Family Law Act states that “[i]n
making an agreement or order . . . respecting guardianship, parenting
arrangements or contact with a child, the parties and the court must
consider the best interests of the child only.”46 Some statutes, including
British Columbia’s, list numerous factors that are to be considered
when determining what is in a child’s best interests, including the very
typical language of “all of the child’s needs and circumstances.”47
These factors include, inter alia, the child’s health and emotional wellbeing, the child’s views, the nature and strength of the relationship

“Redefining the Child’s Right to Identity” (2004) 18:2 Intl JL Pol’y & Fam
147 at 174.
45

Quebec’s Civil Code is similar but does not use the “best interests” language
per se. It states as follows in Article 33: “Every decision concerning a child
shall be taken in light of the child’s interests and the respect of his rights.”

46

Family Law Act, supra note 3, s 37(1).

47

Ibid, s 37(2).
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between the child and significant persons, the history of the child’s
care, the child’s need for stability, and the impact of any family
violence.48 Other statutes do not provide lists that are nearly so detailed.
For example, Canada’s federal Divorce Act specifies that “the court
shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the
marriage as determined by reference to the condition, means, needs and
other circumstances of the child.”49 In general, judges have a
considerable degree of discretion to consider any factor, such as race
or culture, that may be relevant to a child’s best interests, whether or
not the statute lists the factor explicitly.
No custody legislation in Canada makes specific reference to
race, perhaps due to concerns that this approach might perpetuate racist
stereotypes and prejudices.50 Some do, however, refer to culture.
Perhaps as a result, although there is a distinction between race and
culture, these two concepts are often blurred in the case law, with
judges seeming to prefer to address cultural rather than racial
difference. Even so, only six Canadian statutes relevant to custody and
access law refer to culture.51 Where culture is mentioned as a factor

48

Ibid.

49

Divorce Act, supra note 3, s 16(8). Sections 16(9) and 16(10) do include
particular guidelines on the relevance of past conduct and of maximum
contact.

50

Carasco, supra note 9 at 23.

51

Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, the Northwest Territories,
and Nunavut list some aspect of culture or heritage as a factor. See Family
Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5, s 18(2)(b)(iii) [FLA Alberta]; Family Maintenance
Act, CCSM, c F20, 39(2.1)(k); Family Services Act, SNB 1980, c F-2.2, s 1(g);
Maintenance and Custody Act, RSNS 1989, c 160, s 6(e); Children’s Law Act,
SNWT 1997, c 14 s 17(2)(c). The Northwest Territories legislation contains a
unique clause in subsection 17(1): “The merits of an application under this
Division in respect of custody of or access to a child shall be determined in
accordance with the best interests of the child, with a recognition that differing
cultural values and practices must be respected in that determination” (ibid).
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that merits consideration by judges as one of several factors under the
best interests of the child test, it is listed along with language and
religion. For example, Alberta’s Family Law Act directs judges as
follows:
18(2) In determining what is in the best interests of a
child, the court shall
(b) consider all the child’s needs and
circumstances, including
(iii) the child’s cultural, linguistic,
religious and spiritual upbringing and
heritage,52
In no Canadian custody statute is Aboriginal status mentioned,
in contrast to legislation on child protection and adoption.53 The
difference between child custody legislation and legislation on child
protection and adoption may reflect a view that race and Aboriginal
status are more important when a child may be removed from a birth
family than when a custody dispute between parents is at issue.54

52

FLA Alberta, supra note 51.

53

See e.g. Child, Family and Community Service Act, RSBC 1996, c 46, s 2 [BC
CFCSA]; Adoption Act, RSBC 1996, c 5, s 3. This discrepancy figured in the
British Columbia case DH v HM, [1999] 1 SCR 761, 172 DLR (4th) 305,
which involved a mixed race child who had Aboriginal heritage. The best
interests test from the BC CFCSA was cited by the BC Court of Appeal in a
custody determination rather than the test in the BC Family Relations Act,
RSBC 1996, c 128, s 24(1), which did not refer to Aboriginal status.

54

See Carol J Rogerson, “Developments in Family Law: The 2001 2002 Term”
(2002) 18 SCLR (2d) 335 at 358 59; Eileen M Blackwood, “Race as a Factor
in Custody and Adoption Disputes: Palmore v Sidoti” (1985) 71 Cornell L
Rev 209 at 218 19; Twila L Perry, “Race and Child Placement: The Best
Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion” (1990) 29 J Fam L 51. As Bastarache
J. stated in Van de Perre, supra note 1 at para 40, “[t]he adoption and custody
contexts may differ because the adopted child will generally cease to have
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Turning to countries that share Canada’s legal development
from the English common law, we found that legislation in Australia,
New Zealand, South Africa, and some American States also uses
“culture” as a marker rather than race, listing the child’s or parents’
culture as a factor in the best interests of the child test.55 Some also
refer to a child’s indigenous status. More directive language tends to
be used than that which is seen in Canada’s legislation. For example,
in New Zealand’s Care of Children Act, a principle relevant to the
child’s welfare and best interests is that “the child’s identity (including,
without limitation, his or her culture, language, and religious
denomination and practice) should be preserved and strengthened.”56
In California, legislation regarding indigenous children directs
decision-makers to consider the placement that recognizes the “unique
values of the child’s tribal culture and is best able to assist the child in
establishing, developing, and maintaining a political, cultural, and
social relationship with the child’s tribe and tribal community.” 57 In
South Africa, the Children’s Act, 2005 mentions as factors that must
be considered:
(f) the need for the child(ii) to maintain a connection with his or her
family, extended family, culture or tradition;
(h) the child's physical and emotional security and his
or her intellectual, emotional, social and cultural
development;58

contact with the biological parent while custody will generally favour contact
with both parents.”
55

For a critique of the Australian statute’s approach to “culture” see generally
Chew, supra note 34.
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Care of Children Act 2004 (NZ), 2004/90, s 5.
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California Family Code, § 175(a).
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Children’s Act, 2005, (S Afr), No 38 of 2005, s 7(f).
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Australia’s Family Law Act 1975, lists as an additional factor to be
considered:
(g) the maturity, sex, lifestyle and background
(including lifestyle, culture and traditions) of the child
and of either of the child’s parents, and any other
characteristics of the child that the court thinks are
relevant; 59
We will address the question of whether more directive statutory
language on race or culture or both would make a difference to judicial
decision making in our conclusion.
THE LEADING CASE: VAN DE PERRE V. EDWARDS
The Supreme Court of Canada last heard a case dealing with custody
and access and a mixed race child in 2001—Van de Perre v. Edwards.60
Due to its importance as one of the few Supreme Court
pronouncements on the relevance of race in Canadian society
generally, and on mixed race children in custody disputes specifically,
we discuss it prior to our case law review. In addition, the case involved
other significant questions of gender, marital status, and class,
illustrating how difficult it can be to treat particular factors, such as
race, in isolation from others. Van de Perre is routinely cited by
Canadian courts, often for the point that the decision of trial judges
who have seen and heard all the evidence must be given great deference
by appellate courts.61 Our research suggests, however, that it has not
made as much difference to how decisions are made in cases involving
mixed race children as might have been expected.

59

Family Law Act 1975, (Aus), No 53 of 1975 as amended, s 60CC, (3)(g).
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Supra note 1; see also DH v HM, supra note 53.
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See e.g. Fitzgibbon v Fitzgibbon, 2014 BCCA 403, 65 BCLR (5th) 131.
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Van de Perre v. Edwards involved a mixed race child named
Elijah, the biological son of Kimberley Van de Perre, a young white
woman living in the Vancouver area, and Theodore (Blue) Edwards,
an African American man. He was married to another woman
(Valerie), with whom he had twin girls. Mr. Edwards had an affair with
Ms. Van de Perre, who was ten years his junior, while playing
professional basketball for a Vancouver team. The Edwards lived in
the Vancouver area at the time of the trial, but then relocated to North
Carolina. At trial, the mother, Ms. Van de Perre, was awarded custody,
with Mr. Edwards receiving joint guardianship and four one-week
access periods per calendar year. The British Columbia Court of
Appeal overturned that order and awarded joint custody to Mr.
Edwards and his wife, with generous access to Ms. Van de Perre, who
retained joint guardianship. In doing so, the Court of Appeal
emphasized the mixed race heritage of the child more than had the trial
judge. The Supreme Court of Canada restored the trial decision,
returning custody to the mother.
A review of the appeal books indicates that race was not
invoked by the parties at trial nearly to the same extent as was evidence
related to gender, history of care, sexuality (promiscuity), and family
form.62 That said, the controversy about the weight that race should
carry in a custody case arguably elevated the case to a higher status as
a media item63 than it otherwise might have achieved, especially when
combined with the celebrity status of Blue Edwards.
Factors in favour of the father, other than the fact that he was
the racialized parent of a mixed race child who presented as “Black,”
included his financial stability (wealth) and his offer of a traditional
family form with his wife as stay-at-home mother. In contrast, the
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The authors were able to review the appeal books, which included many
excerpts from transcripts, thanks to the generosity of the lawyer for Ms. Van
de Perre.

63

See Williams, supra note 5.
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mother was a single parent without many resources, although she had
been primarily responsible for the son since his birth and had extendedfamily support. The trial judge, Warren J., acknowledged that Elijah
needed exposure to his African-American heritage and culture, but he
also acknowledged that Elijah was mixed race and, as such, his white
Canadian heritage must also be considered.64 Racism as such was not
discussed, and Elijah’s two racial heritages were essentially given
equal consideration.
The trial judge emphasized the “overarching need for the child
to be in a stable and loving environment”65 and concluded that the
mother “has been the primary caregiver for Elijah who by all accounts
is a bright, cheerful and healthy little boy who, I find on the evidence,
has firmly bonded with his mother.”66 In addition to emphasizing the
solid history of care by the mother, Warren J. was not confident that
the Edwards’ marriage would survive Mr. Edwards’ history of extramarital affairs, thus making any evidence about Valerie Edwards as an
excellent parent less pertinent. Overall, then, the trial judge resisted the
efforts of Mr. Edwards to paint Ms. Van de Perre as a promiscuous
single mother without education or stability, and emphasized the
primary caregiving role that the mother had played “under the
extremely difficult circumstances of this very hotly contested
litigation.”67
In reversing the trial decision, Newbury J.A. found the trial
judge erred in not engaging in a close analysis of factors related to Ms.
Van de Perre’s lack of a grade 12 education, her lifestyle, and her
character.68 Newbury J.A. further felt that the trial judge had been

64

KV v TE (1999), 5 BCTC 1 at para 80, [1999] BCJ No 434.

65

Ibid at para 80.
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Ibid at para 83.
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Ibid at para 84.
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KV v TE, 2000 BCCA 167 at para 42, 184 DLR (4th) 486.
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diverted by arguments concerning Mr. Edwards’ affairs and that his
personal life should be treated separately from his ability as a parent.
She decided it was an error in law to consider Blue Edwards in isolation
from the rest of his family.69 The Court of Appeal considered the
Edwards’ family situation to be “superior,” added Valerie Edwards as
a party to the custody claim, and described Ms. Van de Perre’s
childhood as a “rather troubled family background.”70
Significantly, Newbury J.A. also found that the trial judge
should have considered culture, ethnicity, and race and that these
factors weighed in favour of Elijah’s living with the Edwards:
If it is correct that Elijah will be seen by the world at
large as “being black”, it would obviously be in his
interests to live with a parent or family who can nurture
his identity as a person of colour and who can appreciate
and understand the day-to-day realities that black
people face in North American society—including
discrimination and racism in various forms.71
Although Newbury J.A. was careful to state that racial considerations
were not determinative in this case, overall, the Court of Appeal
interpreted the evidence more sympathetically in relation to the
Edwards and resisted efforts to find good parenting by the mother.
Although race was not discussed extensively, it was taken to be a more
significant factor than in the trial decision. The diminished focus on the
history of care by the mother and the negative evidence about her was
enough to persuade the Court of Appeal to change custody to the
Edwards.
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Ibid at para 9.

70

Ibid at para 16.

71

Ibid at para 50.
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The Supreme Court’s main reason for restoring the trial
decision was that the Court of Appeal was wrong to reconsider the
evidence because there was no indication that the trial judge had made
a material error.72 With regard to Valerie Edwards, Bastarache J. said:
“A trial judge cannot give custody to a father merely because his wife
is a good mother. Her presence is a factor but, overall, the court must
consider if the applicant would make a good father in her absence.”73
As for race, Bastarache J., writing for the Court, said that “race
is not a determinative factor and its importance will depend greatly on
the facts.”74 The Supreme Court also referred to the argument of the
interveners (the African Canadian Legal Clinic, the Association of
Black Social Workers, and the Jamaican Canadian Association) that a
biracial child needs key tools in order to foster racial identity and pride,
such as the means to deal with racism and develop a positive racial
identity.75 However, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the
intervener’s argument that race always would be a crucial factor and
should never be ignored in custody decisions. The intervener had not
advocated that the minority parent should necessarily be granted
custody but did submit that “[r]ace is an important or ‘major’ factor,
which must be given explicit consideration and considerable weight in
custody and access cases.”76 They suggested that the question was
which parent would best be able to contribute to a healthy racial
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Van de Perre, supra note 1 at para 35.
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Ibid at para 30. Arguably this statement took account of feminist analyses of
custody cases in which a father’s ability to offer a substitute mother to a child
in the form of a new wife or a paternal grandmother has sometimes trumped
a mother’s claim. See, for example, Boyd, supra note 4 at 96 99, 110 11.
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Van de Perre, supra note 1 at para 39.
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Ibid at para 37.
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African Canadian Legal Clinic, The Association of Black Social Workers &
The Jamaican Canadian Association, Factum of the Interveners in Van de
Perre v Edward, para 3.
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socialization and overall healthy development of the child, and which
parent would facilitate contact and development of racial identity in a
manner that avoided conflict, discord, and disharmony. 77 They also
submitted that, in addition to race being given explicit, independent
consideration, the historical and social context of racialized groups
should inform each specific best-interests factor considered by a
court.78
In contrast to the interveners’ argument, the Supreme Court
gave little guidance to trial judges on the way in which factors such as
race, culture, and caregiving should be considered, weighted, or
balanced in relation to one another. Indeed, the Court appeared to
reduce the question of race to only one of many factors that may be
“considered in determining personal identity; the relevancy of this
factor depends on the context.”79 Perhaps most significantly,
Bastarache J. added that “[o]ther factors are more directly related to
primary needs and must be considered in priority.”80 He stated that
“[r]ace can be a factor in determining the best interests of the child
because it is connected to the culture, identity and emotional wellbeing of the child,”81 and added:
I would therefore agree that evidence regarding the socalled “cultural dilemma” of biracial children (i.e. the
conflict that arises from belonging to two races where
one may be dominant for one reason or another) is

77

Ibid at paras 90–91.
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Ibid at para 93.
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Ibid at para 38.
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Ibid at para 38. Echoes of Racine v Woods, [1983] 2 SCR 173, [1983] SCCA
No 322 can be traced here, although the SCC does not refer to Racine v Woods
in Van de Perre. See text below at notes 132 33 for a discussion of Racine v
Woods.
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Van de Perre, supra note 1 at para 40.
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relevant and should always be accepted. But the
significance of evidence relating to race in any given
custody case must be carefully considered by the trial
judge.82
Bastarache J. observed that “the trial judge noted that this issue was
not determinative and that, in this case, Elijah would be in a more stable
and loving environment if custody was granted to the [mother].”83 He
thus emphasized stability and the history of care, as did the trial judge,
and added that the Court of Appeal had given “disproportionate
emphasis” to the issue of race on its own initiative.84
Although opinion on the Supreme Court’s approach in Van de
Perre v. Edwards was mixed, several commentators suggested race
should have been emphasized to a greater extent.85
CASE LAW ANALYSIS
As we have seen, Van de Perre left the field open to a fairly wide
judicial discretion in how to deal with mixed race children. In the
remainder of this article, we review judicial decisions that were
rendered before and after the Van de Perre case.86 After introducing
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Ibid.
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Ibid at para 41.
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Ibid.

85

Law, supra note 8; Joanna L Radbord, “Equality and the Law of Custody and
Access” (2004) 6:1 J Assoc for Research on Mothering 28; Zahara Suleman,
“Race(ing) Family Law: A Feminist Critical Race Analysis of the “Best
Interests of the Child” Test and the Impact for Racialized Women in Custody
and Access Cases” (LLM Thesis, University of Victoria Faculty of Law,
2006) Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada, 2007.
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These cases were compiled through a comprehensive online search (via the
websites LexisNexis Quicklaw, Westlaw, and CanLII) for family law cases
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our qualitative study we use eight categories to try to understand how
race (and culture) are used in the cases:
(A) Judicial Racism,
(B) Essentialist “Race-Matching,”
(C) Weighing Race and Culture against Other
Factors,
(D) Fostering a Supportive Approach to Mixed Race
Heritage,
(E) Dismissing Race as a Factor: Evidence and
Strategy,
(F) The Role of Access,
(G) Two (Different) Minority Races, and
(H) Does the White Race Merit Equal
Consideration?

“ethnicity,” “minority,” and “bicultural.” The leading case on this topic, Van
de Perre v Edwards, supra note 1, was also noted up in order to locate all
subsequent cases referencing it. The search was up to date as of December
2014. Some of the cases that were found are not discussed in this paper, due
to their limited relevance. These cases include Re Shing, [1898] BCJ No 7, an
adoption case that discusses whether it was in a child’s interest to be brought
up in “her own” Chinese culture; Stutt v Stutt, [1993] OJ No 2149, a child
support case in which an obviously mixed race child was deemed to not be the
child of the white respondent father; NN v TK, [1998] QJ No 4259, in which
the white father raised concerns that the Nigerian mother might return to
Nigeria with their child; SSK v JS, [2002] Nu J No 3, in which the Court
engaged with evidence regarding the tradition of Inuit customary adoption;
and IR v LR, [2007] BCJ No 2684, in which a grandmother was granted sole
custody and was permitted to move with her mixed race grandchildren to
Panama. None of the reported cases involved a dispute between same-sex
parents, although one reported case involved a dispute between a lesbian
mother (in a relationship with another woman) and a biological father with
whom the mother was no longer in a relationship. Both parents were
Aboriginal: JSB v DLS (2004), [2004] 3 CNLR 110.
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On occasion, we discuss cases that talk about religious, linguistic, or
cultural heritage rather than those framed in terms of race. This is
because judges often speak about race and culture in a very unclear and
euphemistic manner. Cases involving children who we can assume are
racialized (based on the identification of their parents’ ethnicities in
judgments) may not directly discuss race, and instead use the
terminology of culture and language to address what are actually issues
of racial discrimination and racism. (For more on this, see the section
“Approaches to Race, Culture, and Ethnicity” above.)
The majority of cases that we found that mentioned race or
culture in relation to a mixed race child came from three provinces:
Nova Scotia (23 out of 89 cases), Ontario (20 out of 89 cases), and BC
(24 out of 89 cases). The high number of cases from Ontario and BC is
perhaps unsurprising, given their larger populations (Ontario has the
highest population in Canada, and BC has the third highest).87
However, Nova Scotia only has the seventh highest per cent of the
national population,88 yet produced almost a quarter of the cases. Apart
from this interesting incongruity, no meaningful differences emerged
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See Statistics Canada, “Population and dwelling counts, for Canada, provinces
and territories, 2011 and 2006 censuses” (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2014),
online:
<www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/dp-pd/hlt-fst/pdpl/Table-Tableau.cfm?LANG=Eng&T=101&S=50&O=A>
[Statistics
Canada, “Population and dwelling counts”]. Note that Ontario and BC also
have some of the highest proportions of racialized people in Canada. See
Statistics Canada, “Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity in Canada” in
National Household Survey: Analytical Products, Catalogue No 99-010-X
(Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2011), online: <www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhsenm/2011/as-sa/99-010-x/99-010-x2011001-eng.cfm>.
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Statistics Canada, “Population and dwelling counts”, supra note 87. Nova
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on Geography Survey – Nova Scotia” (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2014),
online:
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in relation to how courts in different geographical areas of Canada dealt
with mixed race custody issues. Of course it must be emphasized that
our study is qualitative and limited by the fact that most custody
disputes are resolved out of court. As well, many are unreported.
Nevertheless, the reported cases guide other decisions and other
methods of dispute resolution, and are thus worthwhile studying.
The cases do not reveal meaningful differences between how
different levels of court treated issues of race. The vast majority of
custody cases mentioning race are trial-level decisions, with only a
handful of appellate decisions. When race is raised as an issue in an
appeal case, a more in-depth discussion of racial issues can ensue (as
in Van de Perre), but sometimes the appeal court merely affirms that
there is no evidence of race being relevant and dismisses the race issue
that was raised.89
Our study is limited, due not only to the existence of
unreported decisions, but also to the fact that we cannot know how
many decisions involving a mixed race child never made any mention
of the child’s mixed background. Such cases could not have been
captured by our search, although their very absence may suggest
something about how courts deal with custody disputes over mixed
race children—namely that their mixed backgrounds were not viewed
as relevant. Moreover, even when cases do mention some aspect of the
mixed racial or cultural background of a child, it can be difficult to
isolate the impact of race and culture as discrete factors. Race or culture
may be mentioned, but so are many other issues that are relevant to
determination of the best interests of a child. Consequently, it is not
always possible to know the true extent to which race or culture
contributed to the end result, unless the judge is explicit on this point.
These methodological issues are due to silences in judicial discourse
and questions about what judicial words actually reveal about judicial
thought processes, perhaps especially in a field where it is unclear to
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E.g. Adams v McLeod [1978] 2 SCR 621, 84 DLR (3d) 440.
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what extent race or culture should be accorded weight. As we discussed
in the section “Approaches to Race, Culture, and Ethnicity,” it is not
uncommon for Canadians to resort to silence when uncomfortable
questions are raised about racial difference and racism.
We did find cases in which the child was white,90 but from
different cultural heritages. These cases suggest that race and culture
are not brought up as often for white children, and that, when they are
raised, are not considered to be as important as for racialized children.
This pattern reflects the assumption that whiteness is the racial norm
in Canada and is, accordingly, taken for granted. The cases that
mention race and culture almost always involve racialized children.
Where culture and cultural heritage are raised in cases involving white
children, judges tend not to attach as much significance to these issues
as in the cases involving racialized children. For instance, in the early
1957 case Maat v. Hepton,91 the Dutch parents of children that had
been adopted into a non-Dutch family were seeking to regain custody.
In considering whether the trial judge had overlooked the issue of
culture, the appeal judge said that exposure to Dutch culture would be
important if the children were to be brought up in the Netherlands.
Since they were to be brought up in Canada, however, it was of “equal
importance” that they be immersed in Canadian culture (with their nonDutch adoptive parents, who maintained custody). The Court did not
dismiss outright the importance of the minority culture, but it was
clearly not an important factor in the decision. It is possible that the
judge assumed that because the children appeared white, they would
be better able to blend into mainstream Canadian society (compared to
a racialized child), and therefore would not feel much need to engage
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With respect to nomenclature, there was little consistency in the case law with
respect to how judges referred to the racial categorization of the people
appearing before them. Some judges referred to non-racialized individuals as
white, and some referred to them as Caucasian.
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[1957] OR 64, 7 DLR (2d) 488 (CA). This case was appealed at the Supreme
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Hepton v Maat, [1957] SCR 606, 10 DLR (2d) 1.
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strongly with their minority culture.92 This case raises the question of
whether having a strong connection to a minority culture is more
relevant to the best interests of children who do not appear to be white.
We now turn to a more detailed discussion of the cases under
the eight categories that we outlined above.
Judicial Racism
Unsurprisingly, some older custody cases, including those outside our
sample, demonstrate a more explicitly racist attitude.93 For instance, in
1982 in Re Comeau,94 custody of a white child was awarded to the
father, in part because the mother’s interracial relationship with a Black
man was thought to not be in the child’s best interests.95
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This perspective echoes the “melting pot” theory of racial and cultural
assimilation. This theory is largely discredited today, but advocates that
different groups synthesize together to form a new group rather than maintain
their original identities. Implicit in this theory is the idea that it is preferable
not to retain and perpetuate distinct minority cultures and that all people
should instead blend into a common cultural milieu. For an exploration and
critique of the “melting pot” theory, see Driedger & Halli, “Racial
Integration”, supra note 23 in Driedger & Halli, supra note 15, at 55 58.
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Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction (New York: New York
University Press, 2012) at 4.
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to the landmark 1984 US case of Palmore v Sidoti (466 US 429), which
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potential negative effects of racial difference and racism on the child. Palmore
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Racist attitudes are not just a thing of the past, however. Judges
have made explicitly racist comments in their custody determinations
as recently as 1999. In D.T.L. v. L. (Police Service),96 Justice Barakett
made several derogatory comments about an Aboriginal mother,
saying that two “blonde freckled”97 children had been “brainwashed
away from the real world into a child like myth of pow-wows and
rituals” by their mother.98 Justice Barakett also said the children had
been “indoctrinated into Indian culture,”99 suggesting that, based on
their white appearance, their rightful place was in the non-Aboriginal
community. This decision by Justice Frank G. Barakett in the “Audrey
Isaac” case was the subject of complaints by several First Nations
organizations to the Canadian Judicial Council. The fundamental
concerns highlighted by these complaints included the fact that Justice
Barakett ignored Ms. Isaac’s ex-husband’s history of criminal assault
against her and her mother; that he ignored the fact that Mr. Isaac
signed false affidavits; that he demonstrated insensitivity, ignorance,
and bias concerning First Nations people; that his biased views unfairly
affected Ms. Isaac’s and her children’s rights; and that his claims of
brainwashing and indoctrination were not grounded in the evidence.100
The Canadian Judicial Council panel that reviewed the case expressed
their disapproval of Justice Barakett’s statements, but concluded that
he was sincere in the recognition of his errors, and that his statements

v Sidoti went to the United States Supreme Court, where it was ultimately
found that it was improper for courts to give effect to private racial biases in
their decisions.
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did not affect the outcome of the case.101 He affirmed that he would
attend seminars to improve his understanding of Aboriginal culture,
and was deemed capable of continuing as a judge serving the public.102
More recent decisions likely still exhibit elements of racism,
but do so more subtly. Although many judges discuss the value that
minority cultures and identification with a racial minority can offer,
whiteness is still situated as the normative racial identity. When two
parents of different racial or cultural backgrounds are engaged in a
custody dispute, the race or culture of the non-white parent is often
described, but that of the white parent is left to be assumed, giving the
sense that the author of the judgment considered whiteness to be the
norm or the neutral racial category in Canada. Although it is the
majority race in (most of) Canada, the assumption of neutrality is
problematic and reinforces assumptions of whites being racially
superior, as discussed in the section “Approaches to Race, Culture, and
Ethnicity.” The cases Kucherawy v. Gill,103 W.D. v. L.C.,104 D.M. v.
A.G.L.,105 R.C. v. S.S.,106 D.G.E.E. v. J.E.,107 Ho v. Gallinger,108 P.M.S.
v. G.T.,109 Sherwood v. Pardo,110 and Allen v. Wu111 are all instances of
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this tendency to presume and normalize whiteness. One example can
be found in the case D.G.E.E. v. J.E., in which it was stated that “[t]he
child is half Filipino, and the mother promises to expose her child to
the rich cultural heritage of the Philippines.”112 Nowhere in the case
does it also state that the child is part white, nor is there any discussion
of the unique cultural enrichment that the white father could offer.
Essentialist “Race-matching”
An essentialist race-matching approach to custody does not attempt to
address the nuances of the development of racial identity or explain
why the racialized parent might be better equipped to care for a mixed
race child. This approach appears in some older cases113 but, as we shall
see,114 more recent decisions awarding custody of a mixed race child
to his or her racialized parent tend to be based primarily on reasons
other than race (such as stability, parenting history, bonding, financial
means, etc.—the same reasons cited when giving custody to white
parents). If these decisions do discuss race or culture, the judgments
comment on why the racialized parent is better suited to raising the
biracial child (for instance, because they have demonstrated a greater
willingness or ability to expose the child to both sides of his or her
heritage or they are more willing to foster access). As a result, it is
difficult to isolate the extent to which essentialist or reductive racematching has motivated these decisions.

112
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The 1973 case Hayre v. Hayre115 is perhaps the best known
instance of race-matching in Canadian custody case law. The Court
said that society would not “permit” the part-Punjabi child any identity
other than Sikh, and the white mother would never be able to cope with
the task of bringing her son up with that identity. Although the judge
did not say that the child would necessarily experience racism because
of his racial appearance, he did say that the child would not have a
choice in what his racial identity (and his consequent place in society,
one can assume) would be, and custody was awarded to the “Sikh by
race and religion” father despite evidence of the father’s abuse, older
siblings supporting the mother, and the mother being a fit and loving
parent that the judge said he would ordinarily incline towards in a
custody decision. The judge briefly commented on how the father
would be capable of bringing up the child within the language, religion,
and cultural traditions of the Sikhs,116 but did not otherwise address
why race was the main motivating factor behind his decision, leaving
one to assume that the decision was primarily the result of essentialist
race-matching.
Similarly, in the 1942 case, W. v. A.K.,117 although the racial
appearance of an infant with a Chinese father and an Aboriginal mother
was not explicitly discussed, the assumption that the child would be
seen as Chinese (and should therefore live among Chinese people) can
be inferred from the fact that one of the Court’s considerations was that
one particular neighbourhood would be better for the child than
another, because it had a greater population of children of Chinese
descent (or, as the decision says, of the child’s “own kind”).118 In this
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case, the father sought custody and the mother (deemed to have “loose
character”) hoped to complete the formal adoption of the child to a
Chinese couple. The application was dismissed and custody was not
given to the father for several reasons (particularly his lack of
finances), and it was furthermore noted that the adoptive parents’
Chinese neighbourhood would be more suitable for the child.
A more recent (2000) case, Kassel v. Louie,119 is sometimes
referred to as an example of race-matching,120 because a part-Chinese
boy who resembled his Chinese father was placed with his father after
the Court put considerable weight on the fact that they looked similar.
However, the judgment also took into account the fact that the child
would have more continuity and stability if he lived with his father, so
it is difficult to know the real extent to which the decision was
motivated by essentialist race-matching. On a similar note, the
judgment in Thompson v. Murphy121 said that a part-white, part-Black
child was “of the same race” as his Black father, and ordered joint
custody.122 However, the decision commented on why this racial
resemblance was important, saying that the child would need a racial
role model in multicultural Canadian society, and also considered
many other factors apart from race in the best interests of the child
analysis. It is accordingly difficult to determine the true extent to which

Elijah in part because “being raised in an Afro-American family in a part of
the world where the black population is proportionately greater than it is here,
would to some extent be less difficult than it would be in Canada. Elijah would
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essentialist race-matching motivated the decision. In general,
contemporary judges do not appear to adopt an explicit race-matching
approach in the way that happened in some earlier decisions.
Weighing Race and Culture against Other Factors
In this section, we turn to the most important insights of our study. We
first discuss how race and culture tend to be discussed before analyzing
the cases according to: (i) When the Racialized Parent Loses Custody;
(ii) When Joint Custody is Ordered; and (iii) When the Racialized
Parent is Awarded Custody.
Overall, race per se does not emerge as a very important factor
in the custody cases involving mixed race children. Race and culture
are, however, typically very intertwined in the judicial discourse.
When differences between parents could be cast as either racial
differences or cultural differences, it is common for judges to prefer
the latter framing. As mentioned in the section “Legislative Analysis,”
legislation is often silent on race or culture, but when a reference is
made, it is to culture only. The judicial preference to refer to culture
may partly reflect the legislative approach. It may also reflect
discomfort around the blatant discussion of race and racism, or a desire
to cast a broad semantic net that assumes racial issues fall within the
scope of cultural issues. In any case, it is important to note that race is
typically not made explicit in the case law in the same way that culture
is.123
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Racial and cultural issues—such as a parent’s ability to impart
racial or cultural knowledge—seem to become important when all
other factors, such as stability, the child’s attachment to the parents,
parental willingness to foster access, and financial means, are equal.
What this means is that racial and cultural factors (and recall that these
are often conflated) will only work in a parent’s favour if no other
factors tip the scales towards one or the other parent. Racialized parents
and parents belonging to minority cultures are not automatically
favoured because of these aspects of their (and their children’s)
identity. Rather, before these aspects can have any meaningful weight
in a best-interests analysis, both parents must be scrutinized on all other
bases to reveal whether they are on equal footing. Such scrutiny will
likely result in various other factors (such as financial stability and
history of care) working for or against the parents, with one parent
consequently looking like the more fit parent. In such a scenario, racial
and cultural factors will not be enough to change the overall balance of
factors. All other things are rarely equal enough for race and culture to
make an impact in a placement decision.124
This judicial method of considering racial and cultural issues
is illustrated by S.H. v. A.M.,125 which used the phrase “all other things
being equal”126 when discussing the fact that race has the greatest
impact on a child custody decision when the parents are otherwise on
equal footing. In this case, the judge acknowledged that the racialized
mother had greater “cultural competence” and would be better able to
equip her child with the tools needed to deal with being racialized. 127

124

Similarly, the tender-years doctrine or maternal preference was supposed to
apply when all other factors were equal. In fact, the factors were rarely
“equal,” given the heightened scrutiny of women’s conduct as wives and
mothers, making the doctrine much less powerful than is often surmised. See
Boyd, supra note 4 at 63 71.

125

[1998] NJS No 599.

126

Ibid at para 18.

127

Ibid at para 22.

“Race Is Not a Determinative Factor”

345

However, custody was still awarded to the white paternal grandparents,
because the child had bonded more with them.
Further demonstrating the idea that race and culture do not
always have a consistent level of impact on a decision is the fact that
race is sometimes not even discussed in cases involving mixed race
children. In these cases, it was raised neither by the parties or the judge,
presumably because other factors were understood by all people
involved to be more important. One can assume this was the case in
Phelps v. Andersen,128 which involved a child the court identified as
mixed race (with a Black father and a white mother), but did not
analyze race and culture, instead focusing on stability of residence and
ability to meet the child’s day-to-day care needs.
More often, race is at least mentioned, but is not determined to
be significant enough to decide the outcome of a custody case. First, as
we discuss in more detail immediately below, when the white parent
receives custody, the court will typically say that more factors overall
weigh in the white parent’s favour. Often, when this is so, the fact that
the white parent says they are willing to educate the child about their
biracial heritage is seen by the court as sufficient to address any
potential issues regarding race and culture. As the section “The Role
of Access” will show below, access can be another device by which
judges assume that children will be exposed to the racial heritage of the
non-custodial parent. Second, when joint custody is ordered, a
consideration of all of the factors puts the parents on equal footing, and
race and culture do not tip the scales in favour of one parent or the
other. Third, in some cases, issues of race and culture figure more
prominently than in others, but when the racialized parent receives
custody, many other non-racial/non-cultural factors usually weigh in
favour of the racialized parent.
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When the Racialized Parent Loses Custody: Race and Culture are
Outweighed by Other Factors
In several cases, race and culture are outweighed by other factors:
typically, a combination of non-racial and non-cultural factors. For
instance, in Costa v. Costa,129 the minority (Catholic Portuguese) father
did not receive custody because he was overall less able to meet the
children’s needs. Similarly, in Anderson v. Williams,130 custody was
not awarded to the Black father, even though the Court acknowledged
the relevance of racial issues to the child’s well-being. The reason for
the decision was that the father did not have a very good parenting
history, whereas the mother was an overall more fit parent. In Allen v.
Wu,131 culture was deemed an important factor for the part-Chinese
children, but the other factors considered still combined to outweigh
culture, and the white father received custody. In G.W.Z. v. S.M.Z.,132
an Aboriginal mother’s application to vary a custody order was denied
when the Court said that culture was merely one factor, and the white
father retained custody. Demonstrating how non-racial factors can
outweigh racial and cultural ones in the adoption context is P.C. v.
P.C.C-G.,133 in which a child’s white Croatian-Canadian stepfather and
mother sought to dispense with the consent of the child’s Mexican
father to the adoption of the child. Consent was dispensed with,
because the father did not have a history of caring for or regularly
seeing the child, had been a violent partner, and did not pay child
support. The father’s argument that adoption would deprive the child
of exposure to her Mexican cultural heritage was heavily outweighed

129
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by other issues, and the white parents were deemed able to raise the
child with a healthy sense of cultural identity without the biological
father’s involvement.
In the well-known and much cited case of Racine v. Woods,134
a dispute between white and Métis foster parents and an Aboriginal
biological mother, race was outweighed by the bond the Aboriginal
child had formed over time with the foster parents.135 Sometimes
financial and environmental needs are also cited as important factors
that appear to trump race and cultural concerns. In K.J.S. v. M.T.,136
even though the child’s Inuit mother was better able to provide for the
child’s cultural needs, the white father was better able to provide for
the child’s financial and environmental needs, and was therefore
awarded custody. A similar scenario occurred in R.N.G. v. K.Q.N.G.,137
in which the Inuit mother was only granted access, while her Caucasian
ex-partner received sole custody due to his history of caring for the
children, family support, and healthier mental state (even though the
judge acknowledged the importance of the children’s cultural
heritage). D.H. v. H.M.138 was a custody case between an Aboriginal
biological grandfather and the white “adoptive” parents of an
Aboriginal mother who had been removed from her home at an early
age. The custody award of the grandchild to the white grandparents
also pointed to race and culture only having been one consideration

134
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that was outweighed by others such as economic ability, bonding, and
maintaining the status quo.139
Willingness to foster access frequently figures as a significant
issue as well. For instance, in Ffrench v. Ffrench140 race was
considered, and the racialized father argued that only he could impart
cultural knowledge and the necessary tools for his children to deal with
racism. However, the Court found the father less likely to support
access than the mother, so even though the Court accepted evidence of
the reality of racialization and racism, custody was still awarded to the
white mother. S.B. v. S.H.J.G.141 also saw a white parent receiving
custody in part because he seemed more willing to support access.
Similarly, in Sawatzky v. Campbell,142 an Aboriginal father argued that
only he could support his child’s Aboriginal identity. However, the
Court said that it would favour the racialized parent only if all else were
equal. The father had a history of withholding access, there was
evidence of his less than ideal history of caring for other children, and
he was deemed to be overall less mature and capable compared to the

139
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mother. For these reasons, the white mother received custody. In Nova
Scotia (Minister of Community Services) v. B.F.,143 although the
Aboriginal mother argued that she was better able to support the
children’s biracial, First Nations heritage, the case focused on the fact
that the white father had a superior parenting plan and history and
seemed more willing to foster access.
Rushton v. Paris144 is a particularly interesting instance of a
racialized parent being denied custody, even after racial issues figured
prominently in the reasons. This decision was written by Judge Corinne
Sparks, the African Canadian judge mentioned earlier.145 The white
mother received custody even after Judge Sparks considered at some
length the significant reality of racism and the difficulties that
racialized children face. It was determined that the children in question
were confused at best and resentful at worst of their biracial heritage,
and Judge Sparks remarked on the fact that the assessment ordered by
the court did not adequately address or explore issues of race.
Interestingly, it was also said that the assessor did not hear out the
father’s concerns about race, and the mother merely “paid lip service”
about exposing the children to racial and cultural learning.146 There
had, however, been allegations that the father had been abusive and
angry, and he had displayed poor judgment during access visits, which
made him a less suitable parent. Acknowledging that a white mother
may have trouble with some aspects of raising a racialized child,
Justice Sparks awarded the mother custody but suggested she take a
course on parenting biracial children. Judge Sparks also commented on
the importance of the father engaging the children in cultural activities
during his access visits. We return to this idea in the section “The Role
of Access” below.
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When Joint Custody Is Ordered: Parents on Equal Footing and Race
and Culture Do Not Tip the Scales
Since the 1980s, joint custody awards have become far more
common—some would say the norm—in Canadian courts, reflecting
shifting approaches to fatherhood and motherhood and a valuing of the
ongoing involvement of parents in a child’s life.147 This pattern can be
detected in our case sample, arguably as a way to satisfy concerns that
a child have contact with both aspects of her racial heritage. In A.R.D.
v. G.B.G.D.,148 joint custody was awarded in a dispute between a
Malaysian-Chinese-Canadian mother and a white father. Although it
was acknowledged that residing with the mother would better facilitate
exposure to Chinese culture, race and culture were deemed to be only
one factor. Primary residence was to be with the white father, largely
because of a reluctance to remove the child from Comox, where he had
been living, and due to concerns about the mother moving to Malaysia.
Stead v. Stead149 saw a similar outcome, with joint custody and equal
parenting time awarded to both parents, even though the Métis mother
was acknowledged as being more able to guide her son regarding his
Aboriginal heritage, and even though the father had a history of making
racist comments. Joint custody was also ordered in D.M. v. A.G.L.,150
with the primary residence being with the white mother and the
Aboriginal father receiving generous access to support the child’s
cultural development. Finally, joint custody was awarded to a white
mother and a Jamaican-Canadian father in the case of Szakacs v.
Clarke,151 where it was stated that “[t]he fact that an order for joint
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custody will ensure that the child experiences her full cultural
inheritance is a bonus,” rather than a determinative factor, suggesting
that cultural or racial factors did not tip the scales in favour of one
parent or the other.152 In these cases, the overall balance of factors,
including those relating to race and culture, seemed to weigh fairly
evenly for both parents, leading the judges to order joint custody.
Typically, practical concerns such as the need to relocate the child
would dictate primary residence, as in A.R.D. v. G.B.G.D.153
When the Racialized Parent Gets Custody: Race and Culture Are Not
Pivotal Reasons
Typically, when the racialized parent does receive custody, race is not
the overriding reason. When race and culture do figure more
prominently in a decision, they will still be combined with other factors
that tip the scales in favour of the racialized parent. For instance, in
Gordon v. Mustache,154 custody of a part-Aboriginal child was
awarded to the Aboriginal mother. The Court stated that culture has to
be lived on a day-to-day basis and occasionally engaging with it is not
enough. However, the majority of the decision dealt with issues other
than race and culture, such as the history of caregiving, the stability of
the home environment, and parental emotional stability and maturity.
In Gray v. Reynolds,155 the Black father received custody after the
Court discussed the effects of racialization and racism, but much time
was also spent discussing the mother’s history of inadequate day-to-
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day care. Similarly, in Dighe v. Dighe,156 the racialized father was
awarded custody of the child, but most of the discussion centred on
how he was a more fit and dedicated parent. In Imamura v. Remus,157
custody was awarded to the Japanese mother who wished to relocate
to Japan. The white Canadian father raised the issue of a part-Japanese
child potentially facing racial discrimination in Japan, but this concern
was dismissed and most other factors weighed in the mother’s favour.
Similar sets of facts occurred in Takenaka v. Kaleta158 and P.M.S. v.
G.T.159 In I.G.C. v. K.A.C.,160 the father, who himself had a mixed
background with an Aboriginal mother and a Caucasian father, was
awarded custody, and though the court mentioned his ability to share
the benefits of his Aboriginal ancestry, the decision also focused on the
presumably white mother’s poor parenting history. A white stepfather
was seeking custody of his Black stepdaughter in J.H.F. v. A.M.F.,161
but custody was awarded to the Black mother. Race was discussed, but
it was only one of several other factors making the mother the more
suitable parent. In D.G.E.E. v. J.E.,162 a Filipino mother retained
custody over the presumably white father and was able to relocate with
her child to Florida, where her fiancé resided. Race and culture were
mentioned, but were not a large focus of the judgment. In G.A.C. v.
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I.C.,163 a custody order was varied to give sole custody to a Black father
after the white Russian mother removed the child to Russia without
notifying the father. Race was not discussed apart from mentioning that
living in multicultural Canada would benefit the child, and more
discussion was devoted to how the mother had placed her own school
and training ahead of her mothering duties. Finally, in Yu v. Jordan,164
a white father questioned a trial judge’s finding regarding the cultural
benefit his daughter would have by living with her mother and Chinese
grandmother by saying that the grandmother did not actually reside
with them full-time. The Court dismissed his appeal, and though the
Court acknowledged the uncertainty of the evidence regarding the
grandmother’s residency, it was stated that the numerous other findings
supported the mother retaining primary residence, again demonstrating
how race and culture are not the primary focus of judicial decision
making.
Fostering a Supportive Approach to Mixed Race Heritage
When issues of race or culture are discussed in custody cases, they are
often discussed in terms of whether each parent would be able to foster
an open, informed, and supportive approach to the mixed race child
exploring his or her cultural or racial identity, which typically means
exploring a racialized identity or a minority cultural identity.165 This
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Also, in Newfoundland and Labrador (Child, Youth and Family Services) v
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principle was articulated in Van de Perre as being based on which
parent would “best be able to contribute to the child’s healthy racial
socialization and overall healthy development”166 and drew to some
extent on the argument of the interveners in that case.167 This parent
will not always be the racialized parent, and the focus is on the overall
development of the child, so racial and cultural issues will always be
considered in conjunction with other factors. As can be seen in many
of the cases above, considering race and culture in this way along with
numerous other factors may or may not result in the racialized parent
being awarded custody.
Cases in which the racialized parent received custody when
they were deemed to be open to fostering a supportive approach to the
child’s mixed race heritage include Maier v. Chiao-Maier.168 In Maier,
custody of a young boy was awarded to his Chinese-Canadian mother
(who wanted her son to learn about Chinese culture) rather than the
white father (who did not seem interested in enabling that learning). A
similar set of circumstances occurred in Larocque v. Markie,169 which
concerned a part-Mi’kmaq, part-white child. In Camba v. Sparks,170 the
Court also considered which parent would be better equipped to
address the needs of a child with a Black mother and a white FrenchCanadian father, awarding custody to the child’s Black mother.

JC, 2012 NLFD(F) 14, 322 NFLD & PEIR 1, custody of a mixed race partInuit child was given to his Inuit paternal grandparents, after the Court
commented that they seemed more firm in their plan to protect the child’s Inuit
heritage and culture.
166

Supra note 1 at para 37.

167

See supra note 76 and accompanying text.

168

[1990] SJ No 531.

169

(1990), 96 NSR (2d) 241, [1990] NSJ No 530.

170

(1993), 124 NSR (2d) 321, [1993] NSJ No 521.

“Race Is Not a Determinative Factor”

355

Similarly, in Hannebohm v. Hannebohm,171 both parents were found to
be loving and committed, but the Black mother demonstrated a greater
understanding of the effects of racialization and racism than did the
white father. In Flemmings v. Collet,172 in which a Black father was
given custody, a significant concern was that the white maternal family
had a history of frustrating access to the father, which would impede
the child benefiting from her dual racial heritage. As a result, the father
could better support her dual heritage. These cases awarded custody to
the racialized parent after mentioning the racialized parent’s
willingness to foster an open approach to the child’s exploration of his
or her mixed race heritage. However, as was discussed in the section
“When the Racialized Parent Gets Custody,” race and culture still were
not the pivotal reasons for the custody determination. Other factors also
weighed heavily in these parents’ favour, such as history of care and
stability.
In W.I.W. v. M.A.W.173 and Ho v. Gallinger 174 joint custody
was ordered, in part because both parents were seen as able to promote
the child’s mixed race heritage. In Merriam v. McGee,175 joint custody
was also awarded, but the white father was instructed to further educate
himself on how to teach his children about their African heritage and
was prevented from exposing his children to people who might use

171

(1995), 149 NSR (2d) 125, 432 APR 125.

172
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racial slurs.176 In W.M.W. v. J.W.,177 custody of a part-Aboriginal child
was given jointly to his Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal extended
family members, in part due to their willingness and ability to provide
exposure to Aboriginal culture.
In Young v. Mallett,178 Perkins v. Perkins,179 M.S-O. v. R.K.,180
and J.D. c. N.W.,181 white mothers were awarded custody, in part
because they were willing to ensure their mixed race children would
be able to learn about and engage with their racialized identities. In
Pigott v. Nochasak,182 a non-Inuit father was awarded custody of a partInuit child, in part because he was very attuned to the child’s needs and
was well-educated in Inuktitut. In W.D. v. L.C.,183 the white father was
awarded custody rather than the Cree mother, after the father was
deemed to be “sufficiently culturally aware” and willing to support his

176

This case is interesting because the judgment discussed the need for family
court assessors to be trained in cross-cultural relationships and parenting
practices that will foster healthy self-esteem in biracial children. It was written
by Judge Corinne Sparks, who also wrote the decision in Rushton v Paris,
supra note 144, discussed above, which also commented on family court
assessors. Judge Sparks based this comment on the fact that “even though race
is an artificial social construct, it translates into different daily realities for an
African Canadian and a White” McGee, supra note 153 at para 10. The
judgment also talked about the relevance of skin colour to the child’s healthy
self-esteem and identity development, mentioning that the child’s light skin
had caused her to be confused about her racial identity (ibid at para 7).
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child’s racial and cultural development. The mother also had a history
of frustrating the father’s access, and was said to put her needs ahead
of those of the child, which also made the father seem like the more
appropriate primary caregiver. Similarly, in R.C. v. A.A.,184 the white
father figure (who was not the biological father, but raised the child
from birth) received custody over the African-Canadian mother in part
because he was able and willing to expose the child to his mixed racial
background. Also weighing in the father’s favour were his more stable
home, more evident permanent plan for the child, and stronger bond
with the child.
Langille v. Dossa185 raises the complex question of the
intersection of racial and religious identities and considers what is
actually required of a parent who has agreed to expose his or her child
to a minority culture or religion that he or she does not share. This case
involved a disagreement between a South Asian Ismaili-Muslim father
and a white Christian mother regarding the religion and culture in
which their child would be raised. The father had concerns that the
mother was not upholding a provision in their separation agreement
that required the child to be brought up Muslim in addition to being
exposed to Western culture. The Court said the provision was being
upheld, and that it was not reasonable to expect the mother, who was
not herself Muslim, to do anything more than facilitate the father in
educating the daughter about Islam. This meant that the mother did not
have to fulfill Muslim religious duties herself, although the Court
emphasized that the parents must communicate and discuss the process
of the child’s religious upbringing together.186

184
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We cannot properly explore in this space the larger issue of religious
difference between parents and how it relates, or does not relate, to race. For
more on religion and child custody, see Shauna Van Praagh, “Religions,
Custody and a Child’s Identity” (1999) 35 Osgoode Hall LJ 309; Aliamisse O
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Dismissing Race as a Factor: Evidence and Strategy
Race is raised in some cases, but is not a factor in the ultimate
determination because no evidence about its importance is brought
forward. The requirement that evidence of racial issues must be
brought forward before race will be judicially considered was an
outcome of the Van de Perre decision, which concluded that race is
merely one factor among many for a judge to consider and that race is
not always relevant in a mixed race custody dispute.187
Race was not ultimately a factor in the decision in S.E.D. v.
G.S.D.,188 after the judge decided there was no relevant evidence
regarding race. Also, in G.R.B. v. E.L.M.B.,189 D.D. v. A.S.S.,190 F.E.C.
v. A.M.Q.,191 Fairfax v. Garland,192 N.H. v. K.H.,193 Stevenson v.
Kuhn,194 C.C. v. A.S., 195 V.K. v. T.S.,196 and the appeal case C.B. v.
T.M.,197 the court mentioned or alluded to the fact that the child in
question was mixed race, but race and culture were not discussed,

Mundulai, “Stretching the Boundaries in Child Access, Custody and
Guardianship in Canada” (2004) 21 Can J Fam L 267 at 293.
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presumably because neither party submitted evidence of race or culture
being relevant to the child’s best interests.
In other cases, a parent may allege that the other party is racist,
but it will not be a factor in the determination if the judge does not
believe the allegations are true or material or if there is an absence of
evidence of racism. Allegations of racism were deemed to be untrue in
A.C.C. v. I.C.G.198 and Young v. Mallett.199 In Sherwood v. Pardo,200 a
Guatemalan father emphasized the importance of his children learning
Spanish and engaging with that part of their heritage, and also accused
the mother of racism. However, the evidence of the assessor who
originally considered these issues was three years old, and
circumstances had since changed, so a new report was ordered. This
outcome emphasizes the importance of providing reliable evidence
when racism is alleged. Also, in Durham v. Durham,201 which was a
custody dispute in which neither parent was racialized,202 the father
accused the mother of being racist for wanting to move their son to an
area that would have more children who share their culture and
religious beliefs. The Court, however, determined these cultural issues
to be immaterial in the determination of the child’s best interests.
In other cases, instead of becoming a meaningful factor in the
determination, a party’s emphasis on race and culture backfired on the
party intending to win favour. For instance, in Appiah v. Appiah,203 the
racialized father was not awarded custody, in part because his attention
to race and racism was understood by the Court as burdening the

198
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children instead of enriching them. Similarly, in Ffrench v. Ffrench,204
the Black father did not receive custody in part because he had
emphasized racial issues so much that the Court thought he was doing
so in order to deny the mother custody rather than out of genuine
concern.205 In T.K. v. R.J.H.A.,206 a Chinese-Canadian mother’s
emphasis on the importance of her part-Chinese, part-white children
being exposed to more Chinese culture in Toronto compared to
Victoria during a relocation application also backfired. In this case, the
Court said that she was bringing up cultural issues strategically rather
than in consideration of the children’s best interests, since she had not
made cultural exposure an issue during her marriage and had seemed
content until that point for her children to live in Victoria.
The Role of Access
As with most custody cases, whichever parent does not receive custody
almost always is awarded access in one form or another. The access
parent was the father rather than the mother in somewhat more of the
cases we reviewed, also reflecting general trends, and the father was
racialized in slightly more cases.
When the access parent is racialized, as well as when joint
custody is ordered, the court usually mentions, at least briefly, that
having at least some time with the child will permit the racialized
parent to sufficiently impart cultural knowledge or aid with the
development of the child’s racial identity.207 This was the case for the

204
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racialized fathers in K.R.D. v. L.A.L.,208 Anderson v. Williams,209
Darling v. Chung,210 Colley v. Munro,211 Ffrench v. Ffrench,212 Appiah
v. Appiah,213 Sawatzky v. Campbell,214 Rushton v. Paris,215 M.S-O. v.
R.K.,216 Perkins v. Perkins,217 and Young v. Mallett.218 An illustrative
example of this tendency can be seen in Anderson v. Williams, in which
the connection between a child’s biracial heritage and the ability to
explore it through access with a racialized parent was acknowledged.
The Court said that “[d]uring his access to her, Dr. Williams will have
a full opportunity to introduce Alexandra to his customs and traditions.
Ms. Anderson realizes and is sensitive to the fact that because
Alexandra is part black, she and Alexandra will likely have to cope
with racial prejudices that may confront them in the future. I am
satisfied that Ms. Anderson will be able to cope, and that Alexandra

consent was dispensed with so that the white paternal grandparents could
adopt the child. The mother brought up the issue of the child’s biracial heritage
necessitating a more substantial role for her in the child’s life, but the court
said the existing access order was adequate.
208
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will have the benefit of both parents’ support and guidance in dealing
with black related issues.”219
As in cases that do not deal with mixed race children220 and
illustrating general judicial reluctance to deny access to a parent, in
some cases the racialized father is awarded access even when he had a
notably negative personal or parenting history. In R.C. v. S.S.,221
supervised access was given to a Black father of “low moral
character”222 who had a history of substance abuse and violent
behaviour. In Brusselers v. Shirt,223 in which a white mother opposed
the Aboriginal father having access due to him having been abusive to
her, the Court still granted the father access in order to support the
child’s cultural education. In Costa v. Costa,224 the Portuguese Catholic
father also received access, albeit strictly outlined and specified.
Access was also awarded to the Black father in Aziz v. Dolomont,225
even though he had not been involved in the first five years of the
child’s life, in order to support the child’s knowledge of his African
heritage.
Along similar lines, when the racialized father is not in the
picture, access is sometimes awarded to his racialized extended family
instead. For example, in S.H.B. v. R.F.,226 custody of a part-Black child
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was awarded to the white mother, but the mother was instructed to take
the child to visit the Black paternal side of the family. This also
happened in White v. Matthews,227 in which access was awarded to a
mixed race child’s Black paternal grandparents, in part because they
would be able to “offer racial and cultural perspectives” to the child’s
life that “may advance his welfare.”228
When the mother is both racialized and denied custody, access
also tends to be awarded to her to facilitate cultural awareness or racial
identification. This happened in the following parental custody cases:
K.J.S. v. M.T.,229 R.N.G. v. K.Q.N.G.,230 W.D. v. L.C.,231 Stead v.
Stead,232 S.B. v. S.H.J.G.,233 N.A.B. v. H.L.B.,234 C.G. v. P.D.,235 G.W.Z.
v. S.M.Z.,236 N.H. v. K.H.,237 Allen v. Wu,238 Pigott v. Nochasak,239 and
Nova Scotia (Minister of Community Services) v. B.F.240 For instance,
in R.N.G. v. K.Q.N.G., the Court stated the following:
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That being said, while I am awarding sole custody of
K.G. (born January 23, 1997) and D.G. (born September
26, 1998) to R.N.G. I want to put into place as best that
I can a system of visitation and access which will foster
their cultural heritage. I also want to admonish R.N.G.
that as was stated in Paragraph 40 of the decision that I
just quoted that it is important that the custodial parent
recognize the child's need of cultural identity and foster
its development accordingly.241
This statement demonstrates how the Court understood access time as
a means for a racialized or minority parent to impart cultural
knowledge and experiences to their children.
When the racialized parent does receive custody, the nonracialized parent also gets access, as was the case for the white fathers
in the following cases: C.C. v. M.M.,242 Gordon v. Moustache,243 J.H.F.
v. A.M.F.,244 Larocque v. Markie,245 Maier v. Chiao-Maier,246 Camba
v. Sparks,247 Hannebohm v. Hannebohm,248 D.G.E.E. v. J.E.,249
Imamura v. Remus,250 and Takenaka v. Kaleta.251 It was also the case
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for the white mothers in the following cases: Dighe v. Dighe,252 Hayre
v. Hayre,253 Flemmings v. Collet,254 I.G.C. v. K.A.C.,255 G.A.C. v.
I.C.,256 and Gray v. Reynolds.257 The rationale that tends to be used in
these cases for awarding access to the non-racialized parent is simply
that access is valuable for the child and that the access parent has
something to offer. For instance, in Larocque v. Markie, the Court
stated that the white father “has always had a major role, financially
and otherwise in supporting his daughter. Due to his major role, I
would order there be regular and generous access.”258
Drummond v. Lane259 provides an interesting counterexample
to the above cases, where access was initially denied to a racialized
father on the basis of racial issues. In this case, a Black father was
seeking access to his mixed race child, but the mother’s white family
refused to allow it. There were suggestions that the mother’s family
was racist. The Court acknowledged that the father could contribute
positively to the child’s life, but nevertheless did not award access, and
instead implored the father in an interim order to reconsider whether
his presence would really benefit the child when it would cause stress
in the family. Stability and peace seemed to outweigh the racialized
father’s presence. However, in a decision involving the same family,
further to the previous interim order by the same judge, K.R.D. v.

252
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L.A.L.,260 the Court ultimately responded negatively to the family’s
racist attitude towards the Black father and awarded him access.
Two (Different) Minority Races
As we have seen, many custody cases that we have discussed above
involve one minority parent and one white parent. Custody disputes
involving parents from two minority backgrounds seem to represent far
fewer cases, or at least do not evoke judicial comment about race.
When discussion occurs, race and culture do not seem to be very
significant deciding factors.
For instance, in A.H. v. T.R.,261 which involved an Israeli
Jewish mother and a Catholic Egyptian father, as in other cases,
“culture” (which in this case encompassed factors such as religion and
language) was considered along with other factors. The majority of
factors considered (including the fact that some anti-Semitic
sentiments were attributed to the father) made the mother the more
suitable parent for custody, while the father received access. The
parents were encouraged to help the child become knowledgeable
about both aspects of his background (and were also encouraged to
expose the child to a secular context to “defuse the tension”262). In
Pheasant v. Idowu,263 both parties were also from minority
backgrounds: the father was Nigerian and the maternal great-aunt
seeking custody was Ojibwa. Like many other cases, race and culture
did not figure prominently in the judgment—the child had bonded with
the maternal great-aunt, and the father was unable to explain why he
had not exercised access. The great-aunt maintained custody, and the
father was given access in order to impart his heritage and culture. In
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V.K. v. T.S.,264 race and culture, though mentioned, were not addressed
as factors in the best interests analysis, presumably because neither
party brought them up as issues. Similarly, though in the context of
culture rather than race, in Re G.B.M.,265 custody of three part-Jewish
Polish and part-Mennonite children was in dispute. This child
protection case involved the Director of Child and Family Services and
the children’s extended family members rather than a dispute between
two parents.266 The Director obtained a permanent custody order. The
Court, citing Van de Perre’s emphasis on the overall best interests of
the child, with culture and race being but one factor to be dealt with
pragmatically, stated that “[t]he children have equal contributors to
their DNA, as well as equal heritage or cultural contributors. It would
be a gross oversimplification to say that they are half this, or half that—
it is one of the responsibilities or obligations that guardians are
entrusted with, and this Court is relieved at not having to make a ruling
on race or culture.”267 This comment acknowledges the children’s dual
religious and cultural heritage, but consciously resists analyzing it in
depth, relegating culture and religion to a minimal role.
Does the White Race Merit Equal Consideration?
In a few cases, judges expressed a concern that part-white mixed race
children need exposure to the white part of their backgrounds, as
alluded to by the trial judge in Van de Perre.268 For instance, Dighe v.
Dighe269 expressed concern that a part-East Indian, part-white child
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would not have exposure to “Western culture” if raised by her East
Indian father in an East Indian household. The judge was reassured by
the fact that the father wished to raise the child in “the Western
culture.” The judge did not go into detail regarding what “the Western
culture” consists of, apart from mentioning that English would be the
child’s primary language and that she would attend Bible study classes.
The white mother received generous access but was denied custody
primarily due to a period in which she had neglected her child.
Similarly, though not dealing with a racialized child, in Von Bezold v.
Brideau,270 the judge gave custody of a child with German heritage on
one side to the child’s uncle, whose family maintained involvement
with German culture and language “without prejudice” to mainstream
Anglo-Canadian culture. This decision showed a concern for fostering
“dual heritage” (though the judgment also placed emphasis on the
uncle’s family’s stability and ability to provide for the child). Hoskins
v. Boyd271 also made a point of saying that an Aboriginal child was part
white before ordering that the child be returned to his white father.
Finally, J.Y. v. A.C.272 ordered joint custody on the basis that it was in
the part-white, part-Chinese child’s best interests to have equal access
to the cultures of both parents. Szakacs v. Clarke273 also mentioned the
added “bonus” of the child having access to both cultural heritages
(Canadian and Jamaican) in a joint custody scenario. This apparent
concern in some of the case law for supporting mixed race children’s
access to both minority and white backgrounds echoes the melting pot
theory of racial integration discussed above.274 Rather than maintaining
a distinct minority identity as people who present as racialized or nonwhite, mixed race children in these cases were encouraged to see
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themselves as having more than one racial or cultural facet that mix
together, of which the white/Western background was one.
CONCLUSION
This article has reviewed the complex issues that are raised when
parental disputes arise over the custody and access of mixed race
children. We have been informed by the notion that race is socially
constructed in Western societies and remains an important factor to
consider, given that racialization can be related to how a child is treated
and her experience in life. That is, although race may be rooted in
biological markers such as skin colour, its social meaning is of concern
in the legal realm, in particular the ways in which race can generate
racist assumptions and behaviour, including towards children. In
addition, we have noted that race intersects with other factors such as
gender and class, which can also influence assumptions and decision
making. As such, we tried to take a non-essentialist approach to race
and to consider its complex role in judicial decision making.
We agree with Carasco that in a world where race still matters
and racism persists, race is inevitably relevant to the development of
children’s senses of self, their well-being, and to their futures in
society, based on how others perceive them.275 That said, a child’s best
interests must take account of the individual facts in a given case and
the intersection of multiple factors such as race and gender. As several
of our cases illustrate, a parent who is racialized may be a less than
suitable custodial parent due to factors that are unrelated to race, such
as abuse and failure to manage anger. We tend to agree with the
Supreme Court of Canada in Van de Perre v. Edwards that racial
identity cannot trump in these circumstances, although it can, and we
would say should, still be taken into account. For instance, in Rushton
v. Paris, Judge Sparks awarded custody to the white mother, but she
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addressed race and racism in her decision and noted that a white mother
might need assistance in parenting a biracial child.276
The heart of our paper was a study of Canadian custody cases
involving mixed race children, both prior to and following the Supreme
Court decision in Van de Perre v. Edwards. Our case law study shows
that the Supreme Court decision is routinely cited in the cases, but
mainly for the point of appellate courts giving deference to trial judges.
There was no significant finding of different outcomes before and after
Van de Perre, and so we found little difference in judicial decision
making in relation to custody disputes over mixed race children.
Perhaps this finding is not surprising given the hesitant approach that
the Supreme Court took to race as a factor, and its rejection of the
argument that race should be given explicit consideration and
considerable weight in custody cases.277 Prior to Van de Perre, race
was discussed primarily when a party brought it up. Since Van de
Perre, race seems to still only be discussed in any detail when a party
raises it. As we saw in the section “Legislative Analysis,” Canadian
custody statutes do not direct consideration of race or Aboriginal
heritage, although judges have general discretion to consider these
factors if relevant. Moreover, the Court did not give any guidance on
how to weigh race against other factors, apart from saying that race is
“but one factor.”278 At a formal level, then, the Supreme Court of
Canada decision in Van de Perre prevents judges from engaging in
either simplistic race-matching while ignoring other factors, or in
colour-blindness when someone wants to raise the issue of race. That
said, it is not clear that these problems arose often prior to Van de
Perre.
The most significant pattern in our case law study, as discussed
in the section “Weighing Race and Culture against Other Factors,” was
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that race is rarely found to be the key factor and the racialized parent
is not favoured in custody cases involving mixed race children. Indeed
sometimes race is not even discussed in such cases. When it is
considered, race is treated as one among many factors, echoing Van de
Perre. When a racialized parent is awarded custody, there are typically
several other factors in that parent’s favour. When a non-racialized
parent is awarded custody, race is only one of several factors and the
other factors favour the non-racialized parent or there is evidence about
the racialized parent that raises concerns about their parenting. If
factors are more equal between the two parents, then joint custody may
be awarded as a form of “compromise.”
Another trend in some of the case law is to suggest that race or
culture should only make a difference when all else is equal. This
approach can be unhelpful in that it shifts the focus away from race and
culture and onto other factors, thus understating the relevance of race
in a child’s life. The court will spend its time scrutinizing whether all
else is equal before it looks at race, and, in the process of scrutinizing,
it will likely be demonstrated that all else is not equal and that one
parent seems more fit than the other.279 In these scenarios, race never
seems sufficient to sway a decision one way or the other, and
consequently looks like a factor of lesser significance.
We are not suggesting that a racialized parent is inevitably the
parent who is best suited for primary care or custody of a racialized
child. Instead, we suggest that it is key for any parent seeking custody
to be able to demonstrate their ability to foster the healthy development
of a child’s multifaceted identity. This multifaceted identity may
sometimes include multiple racial and cultural backgrounds. As we
mentioned earlier, some of the case law seems to be going in this
direction; when courts do look at race, they frame the issue in terms of
which parent will be better able to deal with issues of race that may
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come up, and this may or may not be the racialized parent. This idea
draws on the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Van de Perre,
which talked about which parent would “best be able to contribute to
the child’s healthy racial socialization and overall healthy
development.”280 This kind of language was used in pre-Van de Perre
cases, but all of the cases that used this framing of the issue and
awarded custody to a white parent in part due to their ability to foster
a healthy racial development were post-Van de Perre.281 As Judge
Sparks suggested in Rushton v. Paris, parental education about how to
raise a racialized child will be useful in many such cases.
In some ways, the cases involving mixed race children are
more similar to than they are different from other custody and access
decisions. Certainly it was clear in several cases in which the racialized
parent lost custody that she or he manifested serious inadequacies in
relation to parenting. Another common trend across decisions in cases
involving race and those that do not is to use access as a mechanism
through which to keep a non-custodial parent’s relationship with a
child vibrant. In mixed race cases, access can be a way to ensure that a
racialized parent can play a role in the healthy development of a mixed
race child even if she or he does not have custody. The extent to which
access is used as a mechanism to deal with the racialized parent’s
claims was, however, striking and might merit scrutiny in the future in
order to determine whether a racialized parent’s merits as a potential
custodial parent are being underplayed. Overall, then, another Supreme
Court of Canada decision giving more guidance on how to weigh race
against other factors relevant to a child’s best interests would be useful.
Legislatures might also consider introducing more directive
language into sections outlining factors related to the best interests of
the child. In the child-placement cases that came up in our study in our
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case law analysis, when the relevant legislation being discussed
referred specifically to culture as a factor in the best interests test,
culture typically was discussed—at the least to say that culture is not a
relevant factor in the case at hand.282 This indicates that even though
most of the cases we reviewed that considered cultural factors were
decided under legislation that did not specifically refer to culture, when
the legislation does specifically mention a factor, it can ensure that at
least some judicial attention is paid to it. Given the discomfort that
some judges may feel in relation to discussing race and culture and the
silence that can result, it could be beneficial to be given further
direction as to what is appropriate in a child-custody determination. As
Amber Chew says, “it is not enough to rely on unspoken logic and
subliminal prompting in the legislation to effect substantive
equality.”283 Like Bunting and Law,284 we are not certain that the
adoption/child protection and custody contexts are so different that the
former requires specific legislative mention of culture while the latter
does not. Exposure to race and culture, and education about these
things, is important in both contexts. Legislation could list race (or
“visible minority” status to use the more common Canadian language),
indigeneity, and culture as specific factors that should be taken into
account when considering a child’s best interests. If these factors are
not relevant in a given case, a court can simply state as such and explain
why.
We also wanted to raise the question of evidence in cases
involving mixed race children, given that the cases discussed in the
section “Dismissing Race as a Factor” suggested that failure to submit
evidence about race or racism might be fatal to race being given weight
in a determination. In the Van de Perre case, the Supreme Court of
Canada stated that if race is to be an issue in custody determinations,
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evidence should be brought forward as to its significance. Bastarache
J. stated that “I would also add that evidence of race relations in the
relevant communities may be important to define the context in which
the child and his parents will function. It is not always possible to
address these sensitive issues by judicial notice, even though some
notice of racial facts can be taken.”285
Possibly in a subtle critique of a simplistic “race-matching”
approach, Bastarache J. observed in relation to the Van de Perre case
specifically that “there was absolutely no evidence adduced which
indicates that race was an important consideration” and added:
As noted by the appellant in her factum, there was
essentially no evidence of racial identity by reason of
skin colour or of race relations in Vancouver or North
Carolina; there was no evidence of the racial awareness
of the applicants or of their attitudes concerning the
needs of the child with regard to racial and cultural
identity. The issues of race and ethnicity were not
argued at trial, nor were written submissions provided
in the appeal. The sole evidence relied upon by the
respondents in this Court was a blanket statement by
Mrs. Edwards that the appellant could not teach Elijah
what it was to be Black and the testimony of Dr.
Korpach that Elijah would likely be considered to be of
Black colour.286
From this perspective, we can understand Bastarache J.’s concern that
evidence be adduced as to the impact of race in the particular case. That
said, some authors have suggested that it should not be necessary to
bring forward evidence of the significance of race or racism in cases
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involving mixed race children.287 Instead, judicial notice might be
taken of the importance of race in children’s lives, especially those who
are mixed race, and the continued prevalence of racism in Canadian
society. Evidence as to the ability of particular parents to deal with
potential racism or difficult social interactions and their child’s racial
identity is likely key in some cases, but requiring parents to bring
forward evidence of racism existing where they live in order for race
to be considered relevant can be an onerous burden and should only be
required when necessary.
Finally, as many others have argued, considerable work needs
to be done to improve the diversity of the Canadian judiciary. As well,
more judicial education about the role of factors such as race, gender,
and class is needed, as well as the ways in which these factors can
intersect in some cases, including those related to the care of children.
In emphasizing the significance of race to children and to parenting,
we do not wish to suggest that the gendered nature of caregiving in
Canadian society should be overlooked. Nor do we suggest that joint
custody or shared parenting norms should be used as an easy
compromise to involve both parents in the life of a mixed race child,
especially if other factors contraindicate its use. Rather, judges and
others involved in child-custody determinations should be encouraged
to consider carefully the facts in any given family’s history and to
weigh carefully the complex factors that may often shape parenting
patterns in the past and in the future.
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